GCHQ Read online

  GCHQ

  Richard J. Aldrich

  The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency

  For Libby (for the dark night-time)

  Table of Contents

  Cover Page

  Title Page

  Sigint and Comsec Locations in the UK

  Note on Terminology

  Abbreviations

  Introduction

  THE 1940s BLETCHLEY PARK AND BEYOND

  1 Schooldays

  2 Friends and Allies

  3 Every War Must Have an End

  4 The KGB and the Venona Project

  5 UKUSA – Creating the Global Sigint Alliance

  THE 1950s FIGHTING THE ELECTRONIC WAR

  6 ‘Elint’ and the Soviet Nuclear Target

  7 The Voyages of HMS Turpin

  8 Sigint in the Sun – GCHQ’s Overseas Empire

  9 Blake, Bugs and the Berlin Tunnel

  10 Embassy Wars

  THE 1960s SPACE, SPY SHIPS AND SCANDALS

  11 Harold Macmillan – Shootdowns, Cyphers and Spending

  12 Harold Wilson – Security Scandals and Spy Revelations

  13 Intelligence for Doomsday

  14 Staying Ahead – Sigint Ships and Spy Planes

  THE 1970s TURBULENCE AND TERROR

  15 Trouble with Henry

  16 Disaster at Kizildere

  17 Turmoil on Cyprus

  18 Unmasking GCHQ: The ABC Trial

  THE 1980s INTO THE THATCHER ERA

  19 Geoffrey Prime–The GCHQ Mole

  20 A Surprise Attack – The Falklands War

  21 Thatcher and the GCHQ Trade Union Ban

  22 NSA and the Zircon Project

  AFTER 1989 GCHQ GOES GLOBAL

  23 From Cold War to Hot Peace – The Gulf War and Bosnia

  24 The New Age of Ubiquitous Computing

  25 The 9/11 Attacks and the Iraq War

  26 From Bletchley Park to a Brave New World?

  Appendix 1

  Appendix 2

  Appendix 3 – GCHO Organisation in 1946

  Appendix 4 – GCHO Organisation in 1970

  Appendix 5 – GCHO Organisation in 1998

  Notes

  Bibliography

  Index

  Acknowledgements

  By the same author

  Copyright

  About the Publisher

  Sigint and Comsec Locations in the UK

  Adastral Park, Martlesham Heath, Suffolk, BT Research Laboratories, 1975–

  Beaumanor/Garats Hay, Leic., post–war Army sigint base & Special Projects Agency, 1945–94

  Bletchley Park; this remained a sigint training site after the war until 1985

  Boddington, Glos, (RAF) military communications unit working with GCHQ

  Bower, Bowermadden near Wick, listening station, closed 1975

  Brawdy, Haverfordwest, Wales, 14 Signals Regiment (electronic warfare)

  Brora, Sutherland, listening station, closed 1984

  Capenhurst Tower, Cheshire, intercepting telephone traffic to Ireland, 1990–98

  Cheadle, Staffs, (RAF) listening station, closed 1996

  Cheltenham (Oakley and Benhall); GCHQ moved to the twin sites between 1952 and 1954

  Chicksands, Beds, NSA/USAF until 1994, then UK Defence Intelligence & Security Centre

  Cricklade, Wilts, GCHQ experimental radio station

  Culmhead, Somerset, GCHQ Central Training School, replacing Bletchley, 1985–94

  Digby, Lincs, main centre for RAF ground sigint and now UK joint services sigint centre

  Edzell, Brechin, US Navy/NSA site, 1960–96

  HMS Flowerdown, near Winchester, listening station, closed 1977

  Gilnahirk, Belfast, listening station, closed 1978

  Hanslope Park, near Milton Keynes, Diplomatic Wireless Service and DTMS

  Hawklaw, (Cupar) Fife, listening station, closed 1988

  Hereford, 264 Signal Squadron supporting 22 SAS

  Irton Moor, Scarborough, listening station, now GCHQ Scarborough

  Island Hill, Comber, Northern Ireland, closed 1977

  Ivy Farm, Knockholt Pound, Kent, listening station

  Kirknewton, near Edinburgh, US listening station, closed 1966

  Menwith Hill, near Harrogate, US Army listening station, taken over by NSA 1963

  HMS Mercury, near Petersfield, naval signals centre, 1941–93

  Morwenstow, now GCHQ Bude, focused on satellite communications, 1969–

  Oakhanger, (RAF) control centre for Skynet since 1967

  Royal Radar Establishment, Malvern, from 1953, later Defence Research Agency

  Waddington, Lincs, (RAF) Nimrod R1s of 51 Squadron since 1995

  Watton, Norfolk, (RAF) Central Signals Establishment, 192 Squadron 1945–63

  Whaddon Manor, Bucks, outstation of Bletchley Park, closed 1946

  Wyton, Cambridgeshire, (RAF) Comets and Nimrod R1s of 51 Squadron, 1963–95

  London

  Chester Road, Borehamwood, (GCHQ/SIS) factory making radio microphones in the 1950s

  Chesterfield Street W1, London office for GCHQ in the late 1940s

  Dollis Hill, North London, Post Office Research Station, 1921–75

  Eastcote, Harrow; GCHQ moved here in 1946 and some comsec staff remained after 1952

  Empress State Building, Earl’s Court, listening station, 1962–94

  London Processing Group, St Dunstan’s Hill, City of London, moved to Cheltenham 1975

  Northwood Hills, small post–war GCHQ site; Permanent Joint HQ since 1996

  Palmer St W1, LCSA headquarters until 1969; also GCHQ’s London office

  Note on Terminology

  On 1 November 1919, Britain created the Government Code and Cypher School, or ‘GC&CS’, the nation’s first integrated code-making and code-breaking unit. The term GC&CS remained in widespread use until the end of the Second World War.

  By contrast, Government Communications Headquarters, or ‘GCHQ’, is a term of uncertain origin. Originally developed as a cover name for Bletchley Park in late 1939, it competed for usage with several other designations, including ‘BP’, ‘Station X’ and indeed ‘GC&CS’. However, the Government Code and Cypher School remained the formal title of the whole organisation in wartime. During 1946, GC&CS re-designated itself the ‘London Signals Intelligence Centre’ when the staff of Bletchley Park decamped to a new site at Eastcote near Uxbridge, although GCHQ remained in widespread use as a cover name. On 1 November 1948, as Britain’s code-breakers began to investigate a further move away from London to Cheltenham, the term GCHQ was formally adopted and has remained in use ever since.

  ‘Code-breaker’ is also a troublesome phrase. Codes are usually considered to be words substituted for others, often chosen somewhat at random. Typically, the military operations that constituted D-Day in 1944 were code-named ‘Overlord’. By contrast, systems of communication where letters and numbers are substituted in an organised pattern, either by machine or by hand, are referred to as cyphers. Yet the term code-breaker is so frequently applied to the people who worked at Bletchley Park and at GCHQ that this book follows common usage.

  The constantly changing names of the Soviet intelligence and security services are especially vexing and so, despite the inescapable anachronisms, the Soviet civilian intelligence service is referred to as ‘KGB’ until 1989, while the military intelligence service is denoted as ‘GRU’. In Britain, the Security Service is denoted here by the commonly known term ‘MI5’ and its sister organisation, the Secret Intelligence Service or MI6, is referred to as ‘SIS’. Ships’ and submarines’ names are italicised, e.g. HMS Turpin. Onshore naval bases and training establishments, e.g. HMS Anderson, are not italicised.

  Abbreviations

  A-2—US Air Force
Intelligence

  ASA—Army Security Agency [American]

  ASIO—Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

  BDS—British Defence Staff, Washington

  BfV—West German security service

  BJ—‘Blue jacket’ file for signals intelligence or an individual intercept

  Blue Book—Weekly digest of comint material for the PM

  BND—Bundesnachrichtendienst – foreign intelligence service of West Germany

  Brixmis—British Military Mission to the HQ Soviet Army in East Germany

  BRUSA—Anglo–American signals intelligence agreement, 1943

  ‘C’—Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)

  CESD—Communications-Electronics Security Department, succeeded by CESG

  CESG—Communications-Electronics Security Group

  CIA—Central Intelligence Agency [American]

  comint—Communications intelligence

  comsec—Communications security

  CSE—Communications Security Establishment [Canadian]

  CSU—Civil Service Union

  CX—Prefix for a report originating with SIS

  DIS—Defence Intelligence Staff

  DMSI—Director of Management and Support for Intelligence in DIS

  DSD—Defence Signals Department [Australian], formerly DSB

  DWS—Diplomatic Wireless Service

  elint—Electronic intelligence

  FBI—Federal Bureau of Investigation [American]

  GC&CS—Government Code and Cypher School

  GCHQ—Government Communications Headquarters

  GRU—Soviet Military Intelligence

  GTAC—Government Technical Assistance Centre, established in 2000 – later NTAC

  IRSIG—Instructions and Regulations concerning the Security of Signals Intelligence [Allied]

  JIC—Joint Intelligence Committee

  JSRU—Joint Speech Research Unit

  JSSU—Joint Services Signals Unit, combined sigint collection units

  KGB—Russian secret service

  LCSA—London Communications Security Agency, until 1963

  LCSA—London Communications-Electronics Security Agency, until 1965

  LPG—London Processing Group

  MI5—Security Service

  MI6—Secret Intelligence Service (also SIS)

  MiG—Mikoyan – Soviet fighter aircraft

  MoD—Ministry of Defence

  MTI—Methods to Improve, sequential five-year sigint programmes at GCHQ

  NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

  NSA—National Security Agency [American]

  NTAC—National Technical Assistance Centre, previously GTAC

  PHP—Post-Hostilities Planning Committee

  PSIS—Permanent Secretaries’ Committee on the Intelligence Services

  SAS—Special Air Service

  SBS—Special Boat Service

  SDECE—French intelligence service

  Sigdasys—An allied operational sigint distribution system in Germany in the 1980s

  sigint—Signals intelligence

  SIS—Secret Intelligence Service (also MI6)

  SOE—Special Operations Executive

  SUSLO—Special United States Liaison Officer based in Britain

  TICOM—Target Intelligence Committee dealing with signals intelligence

  UKUSA—UK–USA signals intelligence agreements

  VHF—Very High Frequency

  Y—Wireless interception, usually low-level

  Y Section—SIS unit undertaking interception activities

  Y Service—Signals interception arms of the three services

  Introduction

  GCHQ – The Last Secret?

  GCHQ has been by far the most valuable source of intelligence for the British Government ever since it began operating at Bletchley during the last war. British skills in interception and code-breaking are unique and highly valued by our allies. GCHQ has been a key element in our relationship with the United States for more than forty years.

  Denis Healey, House of Commons, 27 February 19841

  ‘GCHQ’ is the last great British secret. For more than half a century, Government Communications Headquarters – the successor to the famous wartime code-breaking organisation at Bletchley Park – has been the nation’s largest and yet most elusive intelligence service. During all of this period it has commanded more staff than the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) combined, and has enjoyed the lion’s share of Britain’s secret service budget. GCHQ’s product, known as signals intelligence or ‘sigint’, constituted the majority of the secret information available to political decision-makers during the Cold War. Since then, it has become yet more significant in an increasingly ‘wired’ world. GCHQ now plays a leading role in shaping Britain’s secret state, and in the summer of 2003 it relocated to a spectacular new headquarters that constituted the single largest construction project in Europe. Today, it is more important than ever – yet we know almost nothing about it.2

  By contrast, the wartime work of Bletchley Park is widely celebrated. The importance of decrypted German communications – known as ‘the Ultra secret’ – to Britain’s victory over the Axis is universally recognised. Winston Churchill’s wartime addiction to his daily supply of ‘Ultra’ intelligence, derived from supposedly impenetrable German cypher machines such as ‘Enigma’, is legendary. The mathematical triumphs of brilliant figures such as Alan Turing are a central part of the story of Allied success in the Second World War. The astonishing achievement of signals intelligence allowed Allied prime ministers and presidents to see into the minds of their Axis enemies. Thanks to ‘sigint’ we too can now read about the futile attempts of Japanese leaders to seek a favourable armistice in August 1945, even as the last screws were being tightened on the atomic bombs destined for Hiroshima and Nagasaki.3

  However, shortly after VJ-Day, something rather odd happens. In the words of Christopher Andrew, the world’s leading intelligence historian, we are confronted with the sudden disappearance of signals intelligence from the historical landscape. This is an extraordinary omission which, according to Andrew, has ‘seriously distorted the study of the Cold War’.4 Intelligence services were at the forefront of the Cold War, yet most accounts of international relations after 1945 stubbornly refuse to recognise even the existence of the code-breakers who actually constituted the largest part of this apparatus.5 Nor did this amazing cloak of historical invisibility stop with the end of the Cold War. In 2004, following the furore over the role of intelligence in justifying the invasion of Iraq, Lord Butler, a former Cabinet Secretary, was appointed to undertake an inquiry into ‘British Intelligence and Weapons of Mass Destruction’. Butler’s report into the workings of the secret agencies was unprecedented in its depth and detail. However, GCHQ is mentioned only once, in the list of abbreviations, where we are told that the acronym stands for ‘Government Communications Headquarters’.6 This is all we learn, for in the subsequent 260 pages the term GCHQ is in fact never used, and the organisation is never discussed. The subject is simply too secret.

  Sigint was not simply a Second World War phenomenon. Throughout the twentieth century, Britain’s code-breakers continually supplied Downing Street with the most precious jewels of British intelligence, discreetly delivered in what became known as the ‘Blue Book’. Nicholas Henderson, formerly Britain’s Ambassador to Washington, explains: ‘All Prime Ministers love intelligence, because it’s a sort of weapon…The intelligence reports used to arrive in special little boxes, and it gave them a belief that they had a direct line to something that no other ordinary departments have.’ It was partly for this reason that British Prime Ministers ‘never minded spending money on intelligence’. Signals intelligence also matters to political leaders because it allows them to hear the authentic voices of their enemies. Although Winston Churchill was the most famous recipient of such material, his predecessor, Neville Chamberlain, was als
o offered some remarkable insights into the mind of Adolf Hitler. In 1939, shortly after the Munich appeasement, Chamberlain was given an intelligence report which showed that Hitler habitually referred to him in private as ‘der alter Arschloch’, or ‘the old arsehole’. Understandably, this revelation ‘had a profound effect on Chamberlain’.7

  However, constant exposure to secrets derived from the world of code-breaking, bugging and other kinds of secret listening has the capacity to induce paranoia. Harold Wilson regularly dragged his Private Secretary, Bernard Donoughue, into the bathrooms and toilets of Downing Street. Only there, with the taps turned on full and water sloshing noisily in the basins, did he feel immune to the threat of bugs.8 A top priority for Britain’s technical security specialists during the Wilson years was the installation of the latest scrambler phones at the Prime Minister’s holiday home in the Scilly Isles, so he could speak to Whitehall without fear of interception. Doubtless, Wilson would have been delighted to learn that some of his opponents felt equally oppressed by electronic surveillance. When Ian Smith, the Rhodesian leader, visited London in late 1965 he insisted on having some of the more sensitive conversations with his delegation in the ladies’ lavatory, convinced that this was the one location where British intelligence would not have dared to plant microphones.9

  Secret listening terrified friend and foe alike. Harold Macmillan recalled the almost unbearable sense of oppression he felt on his visit to Moscow to see the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, in 1959. His delegation feared that British codes were compromised, and they were unable to talk freely, even outside in the open air, because of constant technical surveillance. He would have been fascinated to learn that, at the very same moment, Khrushchev and his immediate circle also felt increasingly anxious about KGB microphones, to the extent that they dared not speak freely, even amongst themselves in their own capital.10 In June 1966, to his immense fury, President Tito of Yugoslavia discovered that he was being bugged by his own security chief. ‘Concealed microphones have been installed everywhere,’ he exclaimed angrily to a friend: ‘Even my bedroom!’11